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What’s for Dinner?  Variations in European Support for 
Genetically Modified Food 
 
 
In the last decade, genetically modified food and crops have provoked public outrage and 
consumer resistance in Europe but only indifference in the US (Bernauer 2003; Pollack and 
Shaffer 2001; Vogel 2003; Young 2003).  European objections to agricultural or “green” 
biotechnology (as opposed to medical or “red” biotechnology) have hindered American 
exporters from marketing genetically modified (GM) crops and foods in the EU.   Following the 
ban imposed by six member states - Austria, Denmark, Luxemburg, Greece, France and Italy – 
on genetically modified organisms (GMO) in 1998, the Commission was forced to revise 
existing regulatory procedures and design a system that addressed the concerns of the anti-GMO 
governments. In 2003, the European Parliament, Council, and Commission agreed on approval 
procedures that scrutinize each request for the sale of GM plants or products and lay out in great 
detail conditions for authorization.
1  The new rules went into effect in spring 2004, yet in spite of 
their rigor they have failed to quell consumer mistrust or to persuade certain member states to lift 
their ban on individual GM products or plants.  
 
In this paper, we examine why some member states are more hostile to GMO than others. A 
considerable literature has analyzed why the US and EU have taken different approaches to 
GMO and why American consumers placidly ingest thousands of products containing GM matter 
while their European counterparts reject the same technology and food products as risky. 
Explanations range from different economics of farming and food production, consumer fears 
about food safety, different regulatory climates, the strength of the green biotechnology industry, 
strategies of non-governmental organizations, trust in public agencies, and food culture 
(Bernauer 2003; Gaskell, Bauer, Durant, and Allum 1999; Joly and Marris 2003; Levidow, Carr, 
and Wield 2000; Meins 2003; Gaskell, Allum, and Stares 2003). Other analysts stress cycles of 
regulatory activity and retrenchment, claiming that the EU finds itself in the midst of a 
precautionary regulatory phase while the US has become more leery of extensive federal 
government intervention in the fields of consumer and environmental protection (Dunlop 2000; 
Vogel 2003).  
 
While many studies have focused on the gap between Europe and the US, differences within 
Europe have received much less attention.  As table 1 shows (and as will be elaborated further 
below), the old EU of fifteen member states hardly represents a monolithic, unified, anti-GMO 
bloc. Instead, average popular acceptance of GM foods ranged from 36.5% in Greece to 77% in 
Spain.  Similarly, voting records of member states in the EU’s Council of Ministers and Standing 
                                                 
1 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release 
into the environment of genetically modified organisms http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/lif/dat/2001/en_301L0018.html  Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 September 2003 concerns the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the 
traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms.   3
Committees on GM issues also exhibit considerable variations in the number of “no” votes cast 
against specific GMO approval requests.    
 
[Table 1 on public opinion and government voting about here]  
 
What explains this striking variation among the EU-15?  At first glance, the most obvious 
explanation is that government officials tend to vote in accord with societal preferences; thus, in 
countries with highly skeptical publics governments are more likely to reject authorization 
requests. However, this observation, though perplexing since elites have a tendency to ignore 
societal preferences in Community affairs, begs the question -- why does public acceptance of 
GM food vary across the EU-15? Here our argument is that the strongest and most widespread  
resistance is found in countries where environmental non-governmental organizations forged an 
alliance with associations representing ‘extensive’ family farming specializing in organic 
products or regional specialties. The formation of an anti-GMO bloc consisting of food 
producers and environmentalists – a so called green-green bloc - heightens popular opposition 
and allows campaign strategists to frame risk in a concrete socio-cultural context.  Green-green 
protest movement frame GMO not “merely” as a threat to the environment and possibly health, 
but also as a threat to culinary traditions, food culture, food safety, consumer choice, and a 
certain way of life.   
 
Societal perceptions of GMO determine the extent to which scientific experts and elected 
officials have room to carefully support and encourage green biotechnology research and 
development.    In countries with intensely hostile publics, the biotech industry, scientific 
experts, and government officials are outmaneuvered by anti-GMO voices, who reclaim the 
debate by introducing new concepts concerning the risks inherent in experimenting with 
technological innovations to the country's food production regime. To some extent, the entire 
GMO controversy is linked to the dramatic structural and symbolic changes taking place in 
European agriculture. Interpretations of genetic engineering overlap with a reassessment of the 
impact of  productivist commercial farming on the environment, landscape management, rural 
development, regional differentiations, quality of food, lifestyle choices, and so forth.  
 
Furthermore, in Europe, commercial agriculture did not neutralize or deflect the growing storm 
about GMO because it had not yet embraced green biotechnology. For technical reasons, 
corn/maize in particular is suited for gene splicing techniques because of certain unique 
biological properties. However, corn is not a significant cereal crop in Europe. Because of this, 
European agriculture had not yet switched to GM crops and did not derive any financial or 
agricultural advantages from using these seeds. Second, in the 1990s, research and development 
took place across the EU in different settings (university laboratories or private chemical/seed 
companies) and had different targets in mind (crops, trees, horticulture). It was not until much 
later into the controversy that the European green biotech industry coalesced into a trade 
association, at which point the terms of the debate has been cast by entrepreneurial NGOs and 
frightened consumers (Bernauer 2003).   At key points, big agriculture was conspicuously absent 
and it failed to defuse anti-GMO protest (Ansell, Maxwell, and Sicurelli, forthcoming) 
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We will elaborate our argument below. First, we sketch the current situation in Europe’s 
agricultural sector, which has been subject to multiple pressures and has undergone substantial 
restructuring. Next, we classify countries according to the presence or not of a visible alternative 
farming sector. Last, we single out a few case studies in order to illustrate the argument and 
discuss a few anomalies. 
 
Agriculture in Europe 
 
Our aim is to explore why EU member states take differing stances on the issue of safety and 
benefits of genetic engineering of crops and plants. We measure variations by comparing the 
votes cast by national officials in EU committees that deal with applications for authorization to 
import or sell products containing GMO. Our justification for highlighting votes in official 
Community bodies is that decisions made by officials encapsulate policy preferences on whether 
to support the development of this technology or not. Moreover, the GMO controversy is one of 
the few case studies where elites appear to listen to the public; a hostile public generally 
produces ‘no’ votes in EU permanent committees and council. Thus, the votes are also, on the 
whole, indicative of popular sentiment. 
 
Why would some publics be more hostile than others? We claim that the most powerful and 
intense resistance is found in countries where traditional consumer protection or environmental 
NGOs combine forces with associations representing small-scale traditional food producers. 
When environmental NGOs and consumer associations find common cause with food producers, 
their argument gains greater salience, attracts heightened consumer attention, and puts decision 
makers on the spot. The fusion of environmental priorities with concerns about agriculture spurs 
an emotional debate that makes explicit references to the link between GMO and quality of food, 
regional food cultures, fragile farming communities, the homogenization of mass produced food, 
sustainable farming, and to an earlier era when consumer and producer were directly connected.  
 
What is striking is that not all countries possess an alternative food sector that represents a 
different agricultural regime. Whether a country will acquire a different type of agriculture 
depends on decisions made by officials in the ministry of agriculture, which has to release funds 
and supervise regulations to create or sustain small scale farming. In turn, public authorities are 
more likely to favor the expansion and maintenance of an alternative agricultural regime if the 
country is already in possession of a distinct food culture or if the country perceives it as a 
survival strategy for marginalized undercapitalized farmers. 
  
In Europe, increased attention to alternative food production regimes emerged in the late 1980s 
once it was widely recognized that conventional farming and environmental protection were 
incompatible. For a long time, the Common Agricultural Policy and European society perceived 
agriculture in harmony with environmental conservation. Conventional thinking held that the 
countryside stood to benefit from farming because farmers helped preserved rural areas. 
However, by the late 1980s, public agencies and environmental actors began to recognize that 
farming harmed the environment by contributing to the excessive mineralization of the soil, 
water pollution, disappearance of historic landscapes, unsafe food practices, and so forth. In the 
late 1980s, the Commission announced that European farmers could not continue as before and   5
the Common Agricultural Policy made tentative steps to move away from food security (the 
principal post-war objective) to food safety (the main concern of consumers). In 1992, under the 
rubric of multifunctionality, aside from protecting farmer’s income, Commission objectives 
attempted to balance the income needs of the farmer with rural development, conservation of the 
countryside, and restoration of historic landscapes. Subsequently, farmers were supposed to 
deliver public goods in terms of preserving the particular cultural history of a region and 
redirecting agricultural practices considered harmful to the environment, habitat, landscape, or 
animal welfare (Huylenbroeck and Durand 2003). 
 
In this climate, national governments began to create support schemes to encourage a different 
sort of food production regime more in tune with environmental standards and consumer 
demands. Small scale niche farming accounts for a modest proportion of Europe’s total 
agricultural production because most farms are modern commercial establishments reliant on the 
latest technologies and heavily integrated in agro-food industry. Such farms are found in the UK, 
Northern France, Western Germany, Northern Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands.  Livestock is 
usually the main specialization, which requires considerable inputs of capital and technology, 
and a highly educated workforce. But political and financial support for ‘traditional’ farming has 
grown, mostly because educated middle class households are more demanding about the quality, 
taste, safety, and origins of food products while small farmers are more likely to survive by 
focusing on value added products. 
 
Unquestionably, the front runners in agri-environmental legislation were the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Germany. All three countries passed laws prior to 1990 offering farmers 
payments if they agreed to practice environmentally friendly agriculture. Moreover, Austria 
passed in the early 1990s an “eco-social market” policy to secure the livelihood of a shrinking 
farming sector. Aside from the Austrian arrangements, all of these early schemes were modestly 
funded, with modest consequences, and dwarfed payments transferred to regular farmers. But 
they set a precedent, and the Commission adopted Regulation 2078/92 to create provisions for an 
EU network of protected countryside and nature conservation in 1992. Subsidies were made 
available for countryside protection and farmers were regarded as providers of environmental 
services (Potter 1998 115-127). A decade later, all fifteen member states had arrangements in 
place to ‘extensify’ (rather than intensify) agricultural production (Belletti et al 2003; Buller 
2000; Durand 2003).  
 
But not all countries made efforts to encourage diversification by highlighting eco-farming or 
bolstering marginal farming in poor regions. Ministries of agriculture are critical players in 
decisions on whether to promote niche farming or not, since the formation and maintenance of 
this type of agriculture requires financial support and market regulations. Organic farming can 
only thrive if government agencies employ a mix of instruments such as market regulations, food 
labeling rules, and subsidy/conversion schemes. Food labels must be developed by private actors 
or public agencies in conjunction with private parties in order to establish the authenticity of 
organic products, and public funds are necessary to compensate farmers for lost income when 
they convert from conventional to organic farming (Hofer 2000).  
 
Table 2 lists countries according to the size of their organic farming sector. Organic farming is 
popular in northern countries because it grew out of eco-consciousness and the environmental   6
movement. Its growth accelerated in the wake of consumers' fears triggered by food scares. More 
consumers demand quality assurance and information about production methods. In addition, 
public awareness of the irreversible damage done to the environment by practices that lead to 
soil and water pollution has increased the popularity of organic farming. In the EU-15, the 
organic farm sector grew by about 25 percent a year between 1993 and 1998 and, since 1998, is 
estimated to have grown by around 30 percent a year. The Commission has promoted organic 
farming and two programs, housed under Regulation 2092/91 (organic farming) and Regulation 
2078/92 (agri-environmental program), contain measures to stimulate organic farming or 
traditional food production (Buller 2002).  
 
[Table 2 on organic farming about here] 
 
At the same time, it is clear from the Table 2 that organic farming is first of all a genuine niche 
sector, and second, its popularity is uneven because only half a dozen countries have a 'sizable' 
number of eco-farmers, most of whom are in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Sweden.  
 
Instead of organic farming, Mediterranean countries have taken advantage of Community 
funding and state regulations to revitalize and protect traditional food specialization. Again, the 
Commission has encouraged this type of farming by introducing in 1992 a system known as 
PDO (Protected Designation of Origin), PGI (Protected Geographical Indication) and TSG 
(Traditional Specialty Guaranteed) to promote and protect food products. The purpose of this 
designation is to protect the reputation of a product from unfair competition by products which 
pass themselves off as the genuine article and take the same name. This unfair competition not 
only discourages producers but also misleads consumers.  France, Italy, Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal have been granted a significantly larger number of designations for geographically 
protected food products than northern states and lie above the EU-15 median in this regard.   
 
[Table 3 on PDO designations about here] 
 
In these Mediterranean states, small farmers and citizens in general are heirs to a rich tradition of 
local food specialties and strong culinary identities (Boy and de Cheveigné 2001; Echols 1998).  
Here, too, a mixture of direct support, marketing strategies, and regulations keep this niche sector 
alive. While Northern countries express greater concerns about farm pollution management and 
view organic farming as a possible solution, Mediterranean countries are preoccupied with the 
social and territorial implications of farm abandonment (Buller 2002). Introduction of the PDO 
system is a way to combat depopulation of the countryside. 
 
In all countries, alternative farming is genuinely small compared to the size of conventional 
agriculture.  But what gives this small sector a public presence are organizations that represent 
the viewpoint and interests of farmers who cater to a consumer market that appreciates ‘natural’ 
food with fresh or authentic taste, texture, and pure nutrition and is grown under gentler 
conditions less harmful to the environment. If small niche farmers lack representation or are 
deprived of political recognition, they cannot counter the dominance of commercial farming and 
will not survive.  
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To summarize, the argument we wish to make is that the European consumer considers GM food 
‘risky’ because its ultimate impact on the environment and public health is unknown while the 
direct benefits to the consumer are negligible. However, understandings of risk always emerge 
within a social and political context. Broader social and political factors contribute to the 
identification of particular environmental or health risks. ( Nelkin 1989; Lupton 1999;  Douglas 
1992). The existence of traditional or natural food producers contributes to divergent 
interpretations of the potential costs of green biotechnology. Genetic engineering provokes 
strong opposition once it is perceived as an attack on a way of life and on the lifeblood of a 
critical component of the food production regime. While publics in countries with weak organic 
farming and weak alternative farmer associations worry about the lack of information regarding 
the presence of GM matter in the food chain and therefore demand labeling and tracing, 
consumers in countries with food producers who uphold traditional and biologically responsible 
farming techniques are bothered by the possible destruction of this (struggling) sector.  
 
At the other side of the spectrum, pro-GM forces are underrepresented and disorganized. Green 
biotechnology was pioneered by American seed companies, which experimented with gene 
splicing in order to make commodity crops like corn and soybeans (used for animal feed) 
resistant to herbicides or common pests. European laboratories and the private sector trailed 
behind and were, moreover, spread out over a dozen jurisdictions and politically fragmented. 
European farmers had not yet switched to GM farming and did not constitute a powerful voice in 
favor of genetic engineering. What emerged was an unequal match between a vocal protest 
movement invoking emotional images of “Frankenfood” versus a meek, fragmented, and 
disorganized green biotechnology sector that lagged behind its American counterparts. 
 
All large member states possess a biotech sector. But only a few of the smaller countries 
developed research and development capabilities in this field. An immature biotech industry can 
be understood as both the cause and effect of a different orientation in agriculture. In countries 
where government agencies opted to nurture and promote organic farming, official support for 
biotechnology is modest. In turn, a modest biotechnology industry provides further stimulus to 
deem regional or organic specialization as a viable economic strategy for particular groups of 
farmers.  In this setting, cabinet officials are not subject to cross pressures, as consumers and 
producers do not insist on contradictory courses of action. For officials, rejecting applications for 
GM plants/products does not cost domestic goodwill or provoke powerful business leaders. It 
makes financial to shun GMO in order to protect agriculture from contamination by genetically 
engineered seeds and political sense to avoid GMO in order to heed consumer objections. Table 
4 shows the number of notifications of environmental releases of GMOs under Directive 
2001/18/EC by member states. Many of the most hostile countries do not have an impressive 
biotechnology industry.   
 
[Table 4 on GMO releases about here] 
 
We turn now to an actual description of how our model works. In the next two sections, we 
examine two sets of case studies, namely one set that fits the theory and another set that seems to 
fall outside our model.   8
Cases that confirm the theory: Austria  - the Netherlands – France & Italy 
 
Austria, France, Italy, and the Netherlands represent cases that match our model. Austria and the 
Netherlands are both environmental pioneers with strong traditions of civic action and 
participation. But Austria is completely and unrelentingly hostile to the entire concept of genetic 
engineering of plants and crops while the Netherlands is more tolerant and supportive. Of course, 
Austria has an impressive organic farm sector while the Netherlands excels in modern 
commercial farming. Protest in the Netherlands centered on environmental risks and possible 
long-term health implications while in Austria NGOs focused on those risks but also on food 
quality, superior Austrian ingredients, and struggling Alpine farmers. 
 
Austria 
 
Central to Austria’s position of “absolutely not” is the Austrian environmental movement 
(Wagner et al. 1998).  Under its influence many citizens came to regard green biotechnology as 
analogous to nuclear energy, with both having incalculable risks and minimal consumer benefits. 
In 1978, societal groups organized a people’s initiative to ban development of nuclear power in 
Austria.  Chernobyl proved doomsayers right in 1986, which later increased the risk perception 
of GM food (Torgersen 2001).  The aftermath of the successful fight against nuclear power 
spilled over into mass protest against green biotechnology.   Building on earlier strategies, the 
environmental movement convinced twenty-one percent of the population to sign a people’s 
petition (1.23m signatures) to ban GM food in spring 1997 (Torgersen 2001). The Austrian 
government subsequently banned GM plants and food and required that products with GMO be 
correspondingly labeled.  Austrian retailers also pulled products containing GM matter off their 
shelves.     
 
Austrian governments sided with the anti-GMO movement because they had already quietly 
opted for another kind of agriculture and GM technology did not mesh with the new agri-
environmental direction. Agricultural policy took on a strong ecological dimension, with organic 
farming -- which can be profitable on a small cultivated area -- becoming the survival strategy of 
low intensity Alpine farmers.  The ministry of agriculture and established corporatist agricultural 
organizations ignored the first wave of organic farmers in the early 1980s. But the ministry of 
agriculture switched direction in the late 1980s under the leadership of the People’s party and 
established a special subdepartment to extend direct assistance to this farm sector in the shape of 
general subsidies, marketing strategy, certification and issuance of the “eco-label.” In the early 
1990s, the social democratic-Christian Democratic government adopted an “eco-social market” 
policy to secure the livelihood of a shrinking farming sector. Subsequently, the organic farming 
association expanded its membership rapidly and grew from 200 to 20,000 farmers (Hofer 2000: 
159).  
 
To encourage organic farming and make this sector viable and profitable, official campaigns 
celebrated locally grown food starting in 1994 and required labeling to indicate the product’s 
origin, its quality and independent (i.e. family-owned) control. Public messages reiterated that 
organic farming equaled superior food quality, which was part of Austria’s national identity and 
which represented a better option than EU productivist, polluting, agro-business (Hofer 2000; 
Sassateli and Scott 2001).      9
 
The success of organic farming fostered pride in Austria’s food production. Austrians believe 
that they enjoy higher food standards than other countries. This faith in the superiority of 
Austrian-grown products came into play when the debate on GMO began. Opponents of GMO 
pointed out that organic farming and good food quality were part of Austria’s national identity 
(Wagner 1998). This advantage was first threatened by a precipitous drop in food prices after 
accession in 1995. Farmers and consumers who favored ecologically sustainable farming worried 
about the long-term consequences of this downward price pressure. In addition, green 
biotechnology would hasten the demise of this vulnerable sector if it was not confined or banned 
altogether from Austria.  
 
Political consensus on how to address declining farm incomes and preserve delicate landscapes 
emerged in the early 1990s and centered on encouraging value added food production. Under 
pressure by consumers, organic farmers, and NGOs, politicians yielded to demands to keep 
Austria GM-free.  Moreover, this concession meshed with prevailing orientation of decision 
makers. Ministries of the environment and agriculture each lent support to the campaign to ban 
GM technology because of the threat to organic farming.
 In the Netherlands, in contrast, the 
ministry of the environment was ignored while agriculture dominated and controlled agricultural 
policy. In Austria, a consensus prevailed across the political spectrum that GMO constituted a 
threat to the livelihood of a small group of farmers who occupied marginal land but grew food 
deeply appreciated by the Austrian consumer. 
 
Netherlands 
 
One in eight Dutch adults belongs to Greenpeace Netherlands. According to some, Greenpeace 
has been the most prominent NGO in the fight against GMO. Yet its considerable presence and 
popularity in the Netherlands has not turned the Dutch public or government passionately anti-
genetic engineering. Dutch officials supported each application to import or sell GM product. 
Dutch citizens compared to their counterparts in other ‘green’ countries are surprisingly 
accepting of GM technology.  
 
The Netherlands has a negligible organic farming sector and no tradition of regional specialty 
foods, and it has a sizable green biotech sector based on the number of releases of GM 
experiments. In fact, officials are on record as supporting green biotechnology because it can 
combat world hunger. Of equal if not greater importance is the fact that the Netherlands has a 
significant agro-science industry and it is the third largest exporter of food products in the world, 
after France and the US (Mudeva 2004).  In 2004, the Ministry of Environment gave permission 
to continue field trials of GM apple trees while the Ministry of Agriculture has urged relevant 
interest groups to reach voluntary agreements on financial compensation in case of accidental 
GMO contamination of conventional crops.
2 This would clear the way for the commercialization 
of GM plants.    
 
As in Austria, agriculture was well organized and integrated in decision making thanks to typical 
corporatist networks. After 1945, farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture determined policy and 
                                                 
2 http://www.consubiotech.nl   10
kept outsiders away. While in Austria the emerging problem in the 1980s was what to do with 
marginal undercapitalized farms, the Netherlands faced the opposite challenge: what to do about 
chronic overproduction and excessive waste from livestock farming?   Eventually, the Ministry 
of Agriculture was forced to enter into cooperation with environmental organizations and other 
public bodies to address the agri-environmental crisis. But it resisted the idea of encouraging 
organic farming and of establishing conversion funds for farmers eager to switch. Officials 
expressed little interest in establishing a uniform eco-label. (Hennis 2005: 87-94). 
 
By the mid-1990s, the corporatist system of interest representation ceased to function, as 
farmers’ organizations fell apart and reconstituted themselves into sectoral federations and 
regional organizations no longer representing agriculture as such but rather different product and 
production interests. At the same time, state agencies have taken a more market-oriented attitude 
and have withdrawn from direct intervention in agriculture. While proposals were circulating to 
foster organic farming, the Ministry of Agriculture paid scant attention and only reluctantly 
began to promote organic farming in order to tap EU support for conversions from conventional 
to eco-farming. In reality, food processing industries were more interested than public agencies 
in finding a substitute for intensive farming (Hofer 2000). Because few efforts were undertaken 
to establish a consumer market for ‘superior’ food products, public campaigns did not mention 
any risks posed by GMO to ‘superior’ Dutch produce/products. Consumers demanded choice in 
the form of labeling and tracing information. They cared less about the impact of green 
biotechnology on farming itself, since Dutch society is accustomed to viewing farming as a 
capital-intensive enterprise. Green biotechnology blended in with the orientation of Dutch 
farming, which is still heavily vested in competing on international markets. Pollution and 
environmental degradation are major concerns, but the solution envisioned does not lie with 
converting Dutch farming into a bio-dynamic sector. Rather, technical solutions are sought to get 
rid of excessive manure and overuse of chemicals, and the mental map of policy makers does not 
include a vision of the Netherlands as a primary producer of ecologically friendly products and 
produce. 
 
France and Italy 
 
 
France and Italy have enclaves of agricultural sectors still devoted to traditional methods of 
farming and producing a sizable array of PDO products.  They are also countries with probably 
the strongest culinary identities and Italy is home to the “slow food” movement and the largest 
organic farming sector in Europe. This sector developed locally as committees of consumers and 
producers established a system to market organic produce (mostly fruits, vegetables, but also 
some livestock) and introduced certification/inspection labels.  Growth in organic farming in 
Italy has been exponential and the numbers of farmers has increased from 1300 farmers in 1990 
and over 44,000 in 2003.  Because growth of organic products/produce was local, at some point 
there was a veritable tapestry of dozens of associations of organic farmers found in every region 
of Italy. In the late 1990s, a federative network emerged with sixteen certification agencies to 
bring transparency and rationalization to the system. Still, compared to many other countries, 
organic farming is a grassroots movement led by local interests and monitored by separate 
parapublic agencies.
3 
                                                 
3 http://www.organic-europe.net/country_reports/italy/default.asp   11
 
France had an impressive organic farming sector in the 1980s and the first standards for organic 
agriculture were published in 1972 by the producers’ association Nature & Progrès. The state 
passed legislation on organic agriculture in 1981 and the state logo for organic products, the AB-
Logo (Agriculture Biologique), was launched in 1985. In the 1980s, France was the most 
important European supplier for organic products, and 40 per cent of the Western Europe's 
organic land was located in France. However, by 2004, a mere 2 percent of  utilized agricultural 
area was dedicated to organic farming and 11000 farmers were certified, which amounted to 
about 2 percent of all farms.
4 For the most part, as in the Netherlands, state agencies and public 
officials are focused on increasing export value of French food products and take a productivist 
approach.  
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the underdeveloped organic farming sector, France (and Italy) are a 
good example of how popular opinion views the risks or dangers of GMO in wider agro-social 
terms. In both France and Italy, a connection is laid between innovations related to the advances 
of green biotechnology and the livelihood and survival of a marginal farming sector, representing 
some essential part of the nation’s identity.  
 
Governments were on the whole supportive of genetic engineering and both countries have 
sizeable agricultural biotech industry. The French government poured public funds into 
laboratories with the hope of becoming a leader in the field. Accordingly, by 1996 French 
research and development centers planted test crops of transgenic rice.  Moreover, Novartis’ GM 
corn seeds were authorized in France in 1997 (Boy and de Cheveigné 2001).  Thus, potential 
conflicts of interest and/or sentiment between the green biotech industry and traditional 
agriculture and culture exist.  This conflict may help explain why the governments of France and 
Italy were less opposed than their respective publics to GM foods -- at the EU level France and 
Italy cast only four and five “no” votes respectively, despite considerable public opposition to 
GMO in France in particular.  
 
Eventually, public pressure forced French governments to make a 180 degree turn.  Civic 
mobilization did not come about because of strong environmental activism.  Greenpeace France 
went into the GM controversy small, in financial straits, and with falling membership compared 
to other European countries (Bonny 2003). Instead, conflicts between different kinds of farmers 
had led to the formation of a new interest organization, Confédération Paysanne, to defend the 
view of farming as sustaining employment, rural life, and quality of regional products. Although 
not opposed to modernization, the CP was founded in 1987 to lobby for farmers who do not 
share the capital-intensive business model of commercial cereals farmers or livestock 
entrepreneurs and to promote the idea of sustainable agriculture (Hennis 2005: 111).  
 
For a while the French state excluded CP from its corporatist network and ignored the particular 
agenda of small scale farms in regions other than where intensive farming was practiced. But the 
CP continued to attract members and in 1995 it won 20 percent of the votes in the Agricultural 
Chamber, which negotiates and interacts with state agencies.  At the same time, the organic 
                                                 
4 http://www.agencebio.org/upload/actu/fichier/Chiffres2004%2Epdf 
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farming sector also set up its own organization in 1992, which includes food processors as well 
as producers. Its financial resources are limited and its membership is modest. However, the 
member organizations are regularly consulted with respect to the subsidies and promotion 
schemes available through the CAP (Hennis 2005: 124-25). 
 
The main issue, here, is that Greenpeace France was insignificant but it cemented an alliance 
with Confédération Paysanne, which proved a potent combination.  The CP stands in sharp 
contrast to commercial farms, which are business establishments and which were considered by 
many French as major polluters in the 1990s. The French state also recognized in the early 1990s 
that farming itself accelerated depopulation of the countryside because only modernized large 
units were able to take full advantage of the support system of the CAP. Public authorities were 
also forced to acknowledge that farming causes pollution and degradation of the soil and natural 
water supply. The emergence of CP, which fights on behalf of sustainable farming and 
preservation of the French culinary tradition, resonated strongly with the French public and it 
thus exerted influence over and beyond its organizational reach and its members’ economic 
importance (Heller 2002).   
 
In France, GMO is ideologically linked with the dangers of economic liberalization, 
commodification, and the loss of autonomy -- issues at the heart of contemporary French social 
and political debates (Heller 2001). Many French associate autonomy with the distinctiveness of 
their particular system of food production. As the second largest food exporter in the world, 
agriculture is important to the French economy. But many consumers stress the superior quality 
of home-grown French products, something that is not mentioned by Dutch consumers. For 
example, in a public opinion survey from December 2000, 64 percent of respondents were of the 
opinion that French agricultural products were better than similar products from other large 
exporting countries such as the US, New Zealand, Argentina, etc. Moreover, 69 percent agreed 
with the statement that French consumers care more about quality than price. Accordingly, 81% 
of respondents thought French farmers deserved aid even if it meant French products were more 
expensive than imports.
5  
 
This view of agriculture is not representative of the actual structure of French farming, which 
consists of huge agri-businesses competing in international markets with monocultures such as 
cereals and livestock. But these sentiments were exploited by CP and NGOs and convinced 
French leaders to abandon green biotechnology and keep GM products off the market. It can be 
argued that the anti-GMO campaign is a defeat for big agriculture. Commercial farms dominate 
and determine government policy, and they are not opposed to green biotechnology (Hennis 100-
101). Though big agriculture is not strongly in favor, it is capital-intensive and so would not be 
opposed to biotech technology in principle. But it would be difficult if not suicidal for French 
decision makers to ignore the entreaties of the French people to protect the “French patrimony’ 
against American agricultural innovations. 
 
Italy is very similar to France although commercial agriculture is less export oriented. But there 
is a strong tradition of regional cuisine and food specialties.  As in France, GMO is linked with 
mass production of food and considered inconsistent with the desire of the consumer to preserve 
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high quality and unique food products. Likewise, Italian agriculture is split between more capital 
intensive commodity producers and smaller traditional farmers, and not all farmer associations 
are opposed to GMO. But the opponents of GMO speak a language that resonates with the public 
and that is supported both financially and logistically by NGOs with international networks.  In 
both Italy and France, farm organizations claimed that GMO would undermine the value and 
status conferred by the system of PDO & PGI assignations of products and undermine Italy’s 
international competitiveness in global food markets (Ansell Maxwell, forthcoming; Sassatelli 
and Scott, 2001). 
 
Like in France, Italy’s association of small farmers, Coldiretti, forged an alliance with consumer 
and environmental groups. Coldiretti engages in both conventional lobbying and in less 
conventional action. Its main issue was the defence of unique Italian products from territorial 
homogenization and delocalization. Considering popular support for this message, local 
politicians and political groups helped draft legislative bills declaring various regions GM-free. 
In fact, the associations of organic consumers and producers were at the forefront in pushing for 
guarantees that their locality will remain GM-free. Politicians joined the debate on the side of the 
GM opponents. The rightwing Alleanza Nazionale proclaimed that the inclusion of GMOs in the 
agro-food system would destroy Italy’s reputation of food excellence. For many Italians, the 
agro-food patrimony of a nation is part of its broader cultural patrimony and therefore it should 
not be changed in its nature, but enhanced and affirmed in the global competition (Ansell, 
Maxwell, Sicurelli forthcoming). 
 
Both French and Italian consumers perceive GMO contrary to national food priorities. This sense 
of foreboding predated the arrival of policy entrepreneurs who turned GMO into a national issue. 
But it helps to understand why politicians quickly succumbed to the mobilization of anti-GMO 
forces. Their apprehension and resistance touch a core facet of what it means to be Italian or 
French. 
Cases that fall outside the theory: Finland and Sweden and FRG 
 
Apparently, three cases do not fit the model, and they will be examined next. Germany, Finland, 
and Sweden are green states with medium to large organic farming sectors yet express tolerance 
towards green biotechnology.  How to account for these exceptions? 
 
We speculate that agriculture in Northern latitudes acquired an image that is very different from 
either southern or northwestern Europe. On the one hand, Swedish and Finnish farmers did not 
metamorphose into export giants competitive in international markets. On the other, food 
producers are not heirs or conservers of a unique culinary past. Obviously,  farmers/peasants are 
of historical significance in Scandinavia since they are part of the state/nation building narrative. 
But they are not repository of an ideal past that urban professionals seek to preserve for the sake 
of remembering a time when consumers and producers formed one symbiotic unit and lived in 
perfect harmony.  In fact, agriculture is mainly recalled for its deep and widespread poverty that 
many tried to escape by emigrating to North America. Moreover, climatic conditions are unkind 
to extensive and varied farming and food production consists of a limited array of crops able to 
thrive in a cold and short growing season. In addition, the cold naturally restricts the incidence of 
pests and reduces the need for pesticides. Thus, Finnish and Swedish discourse on agriculture   14
leaves out two distinct issues. Instead of the Dutch/Danish/German concerns about the negative 
impact of capital-intensive farming on the environment, Swedes and Finns confront an 
agriculture that is less polluting and less harmful to the ecology. Then, instead of agonizing 
about losing a distinguished culinary tradition due to the steady abandonment of farms and 
potential pollution of conventional crops by GM plants, Swedes and Finns worry less since they 
do not possess this kind of food heritage.  
 
Although Sweden is one of the biggest countries in Europe, its arable land amounts to about 7 
percent of the total land area. The rest of the land is covered by forests, mountains, marshlands 
and lakes. Since accession in 1995, farming has become more intensive and the average size of 
farms has grown. The use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers has led to nitrogen leakage and  
soil depletion, and loss of biotopes and plant and animal species are acknowledged as such 
effects.  Attention to the environmental costs of farming accelerated after accession and after the 
Swedish Parliament introduced a new environmental program in accordance with existing EU 
regulations.  
 
The largest growth of organic farming took place after 1995.
6 EU support schemes were 
instrumental in its rapid expansion.  However, the Swedish consumer movement had already 
embarked on a national program to convert 10 percent of arable land into organic farming. The 
association of Ecological Farmers used its visibility to publicize the benefits of organic farming 
and to push eco-products into the marketplace. It has good ties with the conventional farmer’s 
federation and they try to coordinate policies. Thanks to a strong consumer movement, Sweden 
can also claim the biggest ecological food retailer in Europe. (Croall 1999).   The Green Konsum 
supermarket chain (founded by the consumer co-operative), with its 450 shops, carries the largest 
selection of eco-foods, which amount to 4.5 percent of total sales in 2003.
 7 
 
It is thus a puzzle why the public (especially in the 2002 public opinion figures) and in particular 
the government are not more resistant to GMO, though public opinion is less friendly than that of 
the Netherlands or Finland.  Still, we would expect a public up in arms to keep GMO out of 
Sweden. Aside from the lack of nostalgic connections to farming/farmers, which describes the 
relationship between food consumers and producers in France and Italy, another factor could be 
the kind of organic farming practiced in Sweden. Grass/clover accounts for nearly 70 percent of 
organic land use. The largest eco-product is milk from cows, which graze on untreated natural 
grasslands.   So there is little danger that pollen from nearby GM crops would contaminate 
organically or even conventionally grown crops in Sweden, because Sweden barely grows any of 
the crops for which there are GM varieties available.   Organic farming mostly fits with a 
discussion on nutritious foods and food safety. In fact, KRAV, the semi-public association which 
represents farmers, processors, trade and also consumer, environmental and animal welfare 
interests, is in charge of food inspection and certification and defines its objectives as promoting 
sustainable development and healthy food options.  Moreover, it would appear that there is 
basically no market for products containing GM matter in Sweden. Food labeling regulations in 
Sweden are strict and under the supervision of KRAV, which opposes GMO. The retail sector is 
geared to carrying organic products, many of which are imported, and is unlikely to sully its 
                                                 
6 http://www.organic-europe.net/country_reports/sweden/default.asp. Accessed March 19, 2005. 
7 http://www.organic-europe.net/country_reports/sweden/default.asp. Accessed March 19, 2005.   15
reputation by selling GM products.   Thus, while Swedish citizens resist GMO to about the same 
extent as the Italians, they are protected from exposure to GM products by the KVAV system 
and their native climate. 
 
Thus, the Swedish government supports GMO as a potential growth sector, and Sweden is on the 
EU-15 median in the size of its green biotech industry.  Sweden’s climate is not suitable for 
growing currently available genetically engineered seeds such as soybeans and corn.  
(Interestingly, KRAV publishes a list of GM seeds on the market and hardly any of the 
commercially available seeds are likely to be planted in Sweden.
8  So the Swedish government 
can vote to support GMO at the EU level, knowing that because of Sweden’s northern latitude 
and cooperative consumer movement GM products will not appear in Swedish stores and the 
most popular GM crops will not be grown.  In turn, the Swedish public can tolerate its 
government’s  stance on this issue because it and its farmers are well protected from exposure to 
GM crops and foods.   
 
Finland has a substantial organic agriculture sector by European standards and a weak green 
biotech sector. Yet Finnish public opinion is characterized by very high levels of acceptance of 
GM foods and the Finnish government has consistently voted “yes” for GMO applications at the 
EU level.  Here, too, we speculate that farming and agriculture play a different historical and 
symbolic role. Most of the farming in Finland consists of animal husbandry. About 80 percent of 
the agricultural area is used as pasture or for arable fodder cropping. Farms are small and most 
farmers earn extra income from forestry. Based on product specialization and farm size, most of 
Finland’s agriculture is low intensity.
9 In addition, Finland has striven to leave rural poverty and 
farming behind by embarking on a strategy of economic growth through high-tech products.  
Late industrialization and the long period of agrarian poverty through the early 1960s seems to 
have engendered different views than elsewhere on technology, the agent (e.g., Nokia 
cellphones) which finally brought economic growth and higher standards of living.  In the 
Finnish popular imagination, biotechnology is identified with information technology, which in 
turn is considered the road to future prosperity.  Although biotechnology is a small economic 
sector in Finland thus far, public officials have targeted this field on par with information 
technology of the 1990s (Rask 2003; Rusanen 2000).  
 
Whereas farming has played a major role in the collective history of the Finnish people, its 
association is with extreme poverty and a reminder of how prosperous Finland has become in a 
short period of time. Finnish farming did not contribute to the emergence of a unique food 
culture that instilled the consumer with pride for the superior ‘quality of food’ found in the 
domestic market. Reliance on capital-intensive farming techniques is low and thus backlash 
against overuse of chemicals and against pollution is modest. Furthermore, while some small 
economies specialized in food processing and became major food exporters, Finnish agriculture 
is at a disadvantage because of the cold and short growing season.   
 
                                                 
8 http://arkiv.krav.se/arkiv/internationellt/GMOrisklist.pdf 
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Germany is the other odd case. Eco-farming has witnessed enormous growth in the last ten years, 
going from 1,6 percent to 4.3 percent of  utilized agricultural area and from 5.866 farms (1 
percent of farms) in 1994 to 16.476 farms (4 percent of farms) in 2003.
10  
 
As eco-farming took off in the early 1990s, organic farmers created their own umbrella 
federation with a dozen regional and sectoral member organizations (regional association 
representing organic farmers in a part of a state or product organization representing organic 
viniculture). The AGOL (organic farmer federation) has access to relevant public bodies and 
regularly participates in policy deliberations. However, it experiences serious competition from 
the main Farmers Union, the DBV, which is extremely well connected and possesses deep 
pockets.  The DBV has coopted organic farming by recognizing it as one of two pillars of 
German agricultural policy. Together with ministry of Consumer Protection, Food, and 
Agriculture, in the late 1990s the DBV acknowledged that farmers produce foodstuffs as well as 
manage landscape, preserve natural areas, and revitalize rural areas. Because of the political 
weight of the Farmers Union, the organic farming or food interests struggle to be heard and be 
treated as an independent voice. In fact, the smaller farming interests must work with the DBV if 
they want to exert any influence (Hennis 160-68).  
 
Although the Farmer’s Union has become ‘greener’ it still supports genetic engineering. But in a 
situation unusual for Europe, the German federal government combines the policy domain of 
agriculture with consumer protection under one roof. In charge of this ministry is a Green 
politician, Renate Künast who is personally opposed to genetic engineering. Yet the single 
largest constituency of the ministry of agriculture, food, and consumer protection is the highly 
visible Farmers’ Union. Officials are exposed to strong crosscurrents, having to reconcile the 
agenda of commercial farmers with the expectations raised by environmental and consumer 
interests. The resulting stand-off has yielded messy compromises. Scientific experts and cabinet 
ministers abstain from voting in Community settings, reflecting the deep divisions inside the 
Ministry itself and between different cabinet officials. Its zero ‘no’ votes are in fact eight 
abstentions. Agricultural interests have historically controlled the ministry of agriculture and 
after its reorganization they still constitute a powerful presence, but their political reach is 
checked by the layer of top officials who represent a very different vision of where German 
agriculture should be in the next ten years.  
 
On the domestic front, it would appear that consumer interests and environmental concerns have 
triumphed. In late 2004, Parliament (Bundestag and Bundesrat) passed a law permitting the 
planting of GM crops, but the law of compensation holds the farmer who plants GM crops 
responsible for any accidental genetic contamination of conventional fields even if there is no 
direct proof that the field of a particular farmer contributed to the cross-pollination. The law 
states that all fields within a certain distance of conventional fields are held jointly liable if the 
contamination of a GMO-free area is proved. This will discourage many farmers from switching 
to GM crops (Stafford 2004 & 2005).  
 
It could be that a return of a Christian-democratic coalition would shift the balance to a more 
GMO friendly climate because a member of the Farmers’ Union held the position of minister of 
                                                 
10 http://www.organic-europe.net/country_reports/germany/default.asp#3, Accessed March 18 2005.   17
agriculture in previous CDU-led coalitions and both the CDU and Liberal party have expressed 
dismay at Künast's "ideologically conditioned go-it-alone" law.
11 Germany is therefore an 
exception because of the peculiar organization of its ministry of agriculture, which at this point is 
firmly in the hands of the Green party and institutionally also oversees the safety and regulation 
of the consumer market. To some extent, Germany underscores the central role played by 
agricultural decision makers who control resources that either boost alternative forms of food 
production or stifle their growth. 
Conclusion    
 
In this paper we argue that the presence of an alternative food production regime and its political 
organization shape the depth, breadth and strength of anti-GMO sentiments. Opponents paint the 
risk factors of green biotechnology in broad and dramatic terms and their narrative links 
agricultural genetic engineering to an attack on a fragile farming sector that offers consumers an 
alternative to heavily processed homogeneous and undifferentiated (and perhaps unsanitary) 
agro-industrial products.  Because widespread protest and opposition is framed by a visceral 
discourse about food culture, regional development, habitat preservation, wholesome natural 
foods, and consumer sovereignty, the choices of government officials are constrained, especially 
in light of the fact the pro-GMO forces are scattered and inconsequential.  
 
Not all European countries have become equally resistant to biotechnology. Regardless of the 
environmental consciousness of a country, some member states are clearly more GMO-tolerant 
than others. We explain this variation by comparing the size of organic farming and regional 
specialization and then tracing the presence of this traditional ‘anti-commercial’ sector to 
decisions made by ministries of agriculture. The existence of alternative or surviving small farms 
is indicative of an appreciation of good food that is fresh, tastes authentic, and is untreated by 
chemicals and fertilizers. When officials decide to promote an agriculture that is more in balance 
with the environment, consumers view genetic engineering as antithetical to the goals of 
preserving nature, managing landscape, and guaranteeing pure healthy foods. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Regulation: GM policy shift in Europe - Common coexistence rules planned” (30 Jan 2005) 
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Table 1:  Levels of government support and public acceptance of GMO:    Number of “no” votes on GM issues cast 
by member states at EU level (first column); and public acceptance of GM foods (columns 2-4), with countries 
ordered in descending order of number of ‘no’ votes.  
 
  G o v e r n m e n t    P u b l i c   O p i n i o n          
# “no” votes 
Country   (out  of  8  total)   1996   2002   1996-2002    
         a v e r a g e         
  
Greece   8    49   24   36.5    
Austria   8    31   47   39    
Denmark 8    43   45   44    
Luxembourg  8    56   35   45.5    
Italy   5    61   40   50.1    
France   4    54   30   42    
 
 
Portugal   3    72   68   70    
Belgium   1    72   56   64    
Britain   1    67   70   68.5    
FRG   0    56   48   52  (EU  median)   
Netherlands  0    78   65   71.5    
Ireland   0    73   70   71.5    
Finland   0    77   70   73.5    
Spain   0    80   74   77    
Sweden   0    42   58   50  (below  EU  median)    
 
 
 
Table 2:  Organic farming in the EU, with countries ranked from highest to lowest, based on organic farming as a  
percentage of total utilized agricultural area in 2000. 
 
Country    Organic  farming   Organic  farms  as   Above  EU-15   
      as % of utilized    % of country’s     median for  
   agricultural  area   total  farms     column  1 
 
A u s t r i a     8     9     Y e s      
I t a l y     8     2 . 5     Y e s     
F i n l a n d     7     6 . 2     Y e s       
D e n m a r k      6     6     Y e s       
S w e d e n     6     4 . 5     Y e s  
B r i t a i n       4     1 . 6     Y e s  
Germany  3    2.8    Yes 
Netherlands   1.6    1.1    Median 
Spain    1.5    1    No 
B e l g i u m     1 . 5     1     N o  
F r a n c e     1 . 2     1 . 4     N o  
Portugal    1.2    <  1    No 
Luxembourg   0.8    1.1    No 
Ireland    0.8    <  1    No 
Greece    0.4    <  1    No 
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Table 3:  Designations of Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) in the 
EU, with countries ranked from highest to lowest in such designations, through June 2004, and Percent of 
agricultural holdings of less than 5 hectares 
 
Country     Number of PDO/PGI  Percentage of  total farms    Above EU-15 median in  
   Designations   under  5  hectares    PDO/PGI  designations 
 
F r a n c e     1 4 4     2 9 . 1      Y e s  
I t a l y     1 3 8     7 8 . 3      Y e s  
P o r t u g a l     9 1     7 8 . 8      Y e s  
Greece    83    76.7     Yes 
S p a i n     7 6     5 7 . 5      Y e s  
Germany  24  &  43
*  2 4 . 9      Y e s  
B r i t a i n       2 8     2 3 . 2      Y e s  
A u s t r i a     1 2     3 6 . 7      M e d i a n  
N e t h e r l a n d s    6     3 1 . 1      N o  
B e l g i u m     4     3 0 . 7      N o  
Luxembourg   4    22.5     No 
Ireland    3    8.5     No 
Denmark  3    3.4     No 
S w e d e n     2     1 2 . 0      N o  
F i n l a n d     1     1 0 . 5      N o  
 
* 43 different beers and mineral waters. 
 
Source:  europa.eu.int/comm./eurostat/newcronos/queen/display.do?screen=detail&landuage=… 
Accessed 9/13/04  (pathway:  europa.eu.int Æ statistics -> agriculture and fisheries Æ free data) and 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/qual/en1bbab_en.htm 
 
Table 4:  Environmental releases of GMOs notified under Directive 2001/18/EC, 1991-2004,  
countries ranked high to low in terms of numbers of releases. 
 
Country    Number   Years  of  release    Above EU-15 median   # “no” votes 
of releases             notifications     in number of releases 
 
France    541   1992-2004   Yes      4 
Italy    295   1993-2004   Yes    5 
Spain    273   1993-2004   Yes    0 
Britain      231   1992-2004   Yes    1 
Netherlands   151   1991-99,  2001-04   Yes    0 
Germany  143   1992-2004   Yes    0 
Belgium    130   1992-2000   Yes    1 
Sweden    79   1995-2004   median    0   
  
Denmark  40   1992-2000   No    8 
Finland    21   1995-2001,  2004   No    0   
Greece    19   1996-99    No    8 
Portugal    12   1993-95,  1997-99   No    3 
Ireland    5   1997,  1998   No    0 
Austria    3   1996,  1997   No    8 
Luxembourg   0      No    8 
 
Source:  “Deliberate Field Trials,” http: biotech.jrc.it/deliberate/dbcountries.asp, accessed Jan. 11, 2005.   
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Table 5: Summary of Variables and Classification of Countries 
 
Group One:  Against GMO and for moratorium (and independent variables consistent with 
opposition to GMO) 
 
   O r g /  
Country*    Pdo  PubOp   VS  GrBio    PubOp   Total                           
 
 
A      8/0  *   Y  Y        3:0 
L        8/0        Y        2:0 
Dk    8/0  Y  Y        3:0 
Gr      8/0  Y  Y        2:0 
I          5/2    Y     Y     2:1   
F        4/4    Y  Y    Y     2:1 
 
 
 
Group Two:  Friendly or on-balance-friendly to GMO and did not participate in moratorium (and 
independent variables consistent with that)  
 
   O r g /  
Country    Pdo  PubOp   VS  GrBio    PubOp   Total                           
 
NL    0/8      Y   Y   1:2 
UK    1/6   Y     Y   Y   1:2 
Irl          0/5         Y   0:1 
E   0/2     Y        Y    Y           1:2    
P    3/4    Y       Y   1:1 
B  2/3              Y    Y              0:2 
 
 
Group Three:  Anomaly cases  
 
  
S      0/7    Y  Y                        3:1 
Fin   0/8    Y            Y              2:1 
D    0/0    Y     Y     2:2 
 
 
 
*  The numbers next to the initials for each country are the number of “no” votes/ the number of 
“yes” votes.  So for Austria, 8/0 means eight no votes and 0 yes votes. 
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Table 6. Visibility of alternative small scale peasant organic farming associations 
 
    Organization    Recognized                 Subsidies/Marketing Strat.      
Level       by Public Authorities  Organic Farming Laws 
 
Austria   Medium  -   yes    high  –  private  sector  eco  label 
  Many  organizations   
 
Belgium     few  farmers   yes    modest  -  regionalized 
 
Denmark  high – 65% of    yes      high – state eco label 
  organic  farmers  –  allied 
    with one of two mainstream organizations 
  
France     Organic farming low, but  organic farming no  moderate – focus is still on commercial   
    Small scale farming high  family farming yes  farms – programs in place to combat  
        depopulation  includes  support  for  different   
        a g r i c u l t u r a l   p r a c t i c e s  
   
Germany  subordinate to main          Green party     multiple eco-labels, intensely regionalized,  
    Farmers union    in control    Support varies by State, FGovt 2010Æ20% 
of agric organic 
  
 
  
Italy    numerous at regional/local level. yes      high – 16 certification agencies – 
  Different  objectives. 
 
Netherlands  low – many organizations       no – except in conformity with EU rules   
        D i f f e r e n t   e c o - l a b e l s  
 
Portugal    barely any organic farmers       laggard, agriculture not fully modernized, 
impetus for organic came late and thru EU    
  
Britain    small, varies by region        early history, but ignored by UK govt 
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